Strategic Roadmap for South Korea–China Tech Cooperation from 2026

Xiuli Chen

— 27 min read

After years of cautious engagement amid geopolitical tensions, 2025 saw notable rapprochement. In November 2025, a presidential summit (South Korea’s President and China’s President Xi) produced multiple MOUs on reopening economic, cultural, and technology exchanges. South Korean innovation agencies immediately launched missions to Chinese tech hubs – e.g. opening a startup office in Shenzhen and linking Korean deep-tech startups with Chinese venture capital. Likewise, Chinese officials and business leaders attended forums in Seoul emphasizing supply chain cooperation and joint innovation in AI, robotics, and biotech. This momentum sets the stage for mapping sector-specific opportunities and recommending strategies to capitalize on this “new phase” of the cross-border innovation corridor being re-established.

In 2026, it is crucial for the President of South Korea, accompanied by executives from top Korean conglomerates (Samsung, Hyundai Motor Group, SK, LG, etc.), to embark on a landmark visit to Beijing, the Yangtze River Delta （YRD）, or the Greater Bay Area (GBA) in China. This high-level delegation can reinvigorate bilateral ties and forge new tech partnerships after a period of strained relations. China and South Korea are deeply intertwined in supply chains and have a mutually beneficial partnership that has contributed significantly to regional stability and prosperity. Both governments have signaled intent to strengthen cooperation in emerging industries – from semiconductors and batteries to digital technologies – as a strategic choice for future growth. This report provides a deep strategic analysis and roadmap for South Korea–China cooperation in key high-tech sectors (semiconductors, AI, robotics, biotech), identifies potential firm-to-firm partnerships (including Hangzhou’s “Six Little Dragons” startups and GBA tech giants), and offers policy and business recommendations to integrate SMEs and boost both economies. The goal is to leverage complementary strengths – China’s vast market, capital, and rapid innovation ecosystem, and South Korea’s advanced materials, manufacturing, and R&D prowess – to create win-win collaborations that drive domestic economic enhancement in both countries.

Opportunities in Key Sectors for Bilateral Cooperation

Both nations have identified semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and biotechnology as strategic sectors for the next wave of growth and have invested heavily in these areas. In 2026, focused dialogues and industry workshops in Beijing, the Yangtze River Delta (YRD), and the GBA can map out collaborations across sectors.

Semiconductors: Securing and Innovating the Chip Supply Chain

South Korea is a world leader in semiconductors (especially memory chips via Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix), while China is the world’s largest semiconductor market with ambitions for self-reliance. Both sides share an interest in stable chip supply chains amid global disruptions. In mid-2023, China and South Korea agreed to “strengthen dialogue and cooperation on semiconductor industry supply chains”. This creates an opening to coordinate on non-sensitive areas such as materials, equipment, and legacy chip technologies. Key opportunities include:

  • Raw Materials and Components. South Korea has asked China to help stabilize supply of critical raw materials for chips and ensure a predictable business environment for Korean chipmakers in China. Follow-up in 2026 could yield MOUs guaranteeing Korean firms access to Chinese rare earths, wafers, specialty chemicals, etc., while South Korea ensures a reliable supply of its high-purity semiconductor materials to Chinese fabs. This exchange would reduce supply shocks and benefit both sides’ manufacturing.
  • Joint Ventures in Mature Nodes and Packaging. Given U.S. export controls on cutting-edge nodes, collaboration can focus on mature technology (28nm and above) and advanced packaging. Korean foundries or equipment firms might establish JV plants in China’s tech parks for chip assembly, testing, or packaging, tapping China’s scale and South Korea’s expertise. Such JVs can meet China’s huge mid-range chip demand while creating revenue for Korean firms without violating export restrictions.
  • R&D and Talent Exchange. A bilateral Semiconductor R&D fund could be launched to co-sponsor research in areas such as new memory materials and AI chips, involving institutes from both countries. Student and engineer exchange programs (leveraging Korea’s engineering talent and China’s growing semiconductor education output) would develop a talent pipeline. For instance, joint research on memory–logic integration or chiplets could leverage South Korea’s strength in memory with China’s strength in AI algorithms, leading to innovative products.
  • Supply Chain Security Coordination. The two governments should set up a Semiconductor Supply Chain Council at the working level, as hinted in earlier talks, to share information on potential disruptions and coordinate responses (e.g. if one faces sanctions or shortages). This could involve early warning mechanisms and alignment on international standards (South Korea and China both play roles in ISO/IEC and ITU). By acting in concert – for example, jointly opposing protectionist measures that hurt chip trade – they strengthen their domestic industries’ resilience.

Outlook through 2026

South Korea has announced massive investments (over $518 billion through 2030) to retain its chip leadership, and China reportedly plans to invest $70 billion in its chip sector. Rather than duplicate efforts, strategic cooperation in the above areas can increase efficiency. For South Korea, maintaining the Chinese market (40% of its chip exports go to China) while diversifying risk is vital. For China, partnering with Korean firms offers access to some advanced tech and know-how, helping it move up the value chain. A successful 2026 dialogue could yield agreements on materials security, JV projects, and a commitment to regular semiconductor policy consultations.

Artificial Intelligence: Joint Innovation in Algorithms and Applications

AI is a high-priority sector for both countries. China’s AI industry is booming – from computer vision to large language models (LLMs) – under strong government support, while South Korea is implementing a $108 billion fund (150 trillion won) to boost AI and other advanced industries over 5 years. Collaboration in AI can be mutually beneficial, combining China’s scale in data and startups with South Korea’s strength in semiconductors, sensors, and specific AI niches:

  • AI Research & Development Alliances. Despite intense US-China competition, China and South Korea have begun to deepen collaboration in cutting-edge areas like AI. A model is emerging where government guidance, enterprise collaboration, and joint R&D yield tangible results. In practice, this could mean Korean tech firms and universities partnering with Chinese AI labs on fundamental research (e.g. Samsung Electronics or KAIST collaborating with Shenzhen or Hangzhou AI institutes on next-gen AI chips or neuromorphic computing). Joint labs could be established in neutral venues (for example, an AI Research Center in Hangzhou’s future tech zone with Korean and Chinese researchers). Both sides would share costs and IP, accelerating innovation.
  • Large Language Models and Open-Source AI. Notably, Hangzhou-based startup DeepSeek (one of the “Six Little Dragons”) made headlines in 2025 by launching a cost-effective LLM rivaling Silicon Valley models. Alibaba and DeepSeek have since produced top-performing open-source AI models. Korean companies (like Naver, which developed its own hyper-scale AI, or SK Telecom’s AI initiatives) could partner with DeepSeek and others on multilingual LLMs suited for Asian languages. This would leverage Chinese advancements in generative AI and Korea’s linguistic resources and semiconductor hardware to create competitive AI platforms. Collaboration on open-source AI aligns with both countries’ interest in reducing reliance on Western AI ecosystems.
  • Industrial AI and Manufacturing 4.0. The integration of AI in manufacturing is critical as China leads in AI-driven factory automation and South Korea seeks to “retool factories with AI” to boost productivity. Korean firms can adopt Chinese AI solutions for smart factories. For example, Alibaba Cloud’s AI and computer vision algorithms (or startups’ solutions) could be piloted in Samsung or SK Hynix’s production lines to optimize operations, under joint supervision. Conversely, Korean IT service firms (e.g. Samsung SDS, LG CNS) can offer expertise in systems integration to Chinese factories implementing AI. A bilateral working group on AI in manufacturing could share best practices and promote co-development of standards for smart manufacturing – benefiting both countries’ efforts to sustain industrial competitiveness.
  • AI for Societal Challenges. Both societies face aging populations and see AI as part of the solution. Cooperation in AI for healthcare and elder care is a promising niche and South Korea’s medical AI startups (for diagnostic imaging, AI caregivers, etc.) can link with Chinese partners to train algorithms on larger datasets and deploy at scale. The 2025 APEC summit (hosted by Korea) even achieved a historic joint declaration on AI collaboration and demographic change. Building on that, China and Korea could launch a Joint AI-Healthcare Initiative focusing on assistive robotics, AI health monitoring, and smart senior living solutions – leveraging China’s market scale and South Korea’s biomedical industry. This directly ties into mutual domestic needs, creating business opportunities while addressing social welfare.
  • Ethical and Policy Coordination. As AI technologies proliferate, it’s crucial for governments to coordinate on governance. South Korea and China can use forums like APEC and bilateral channels to develop a shared framework on AI ethics and safety. The fact that APEC 2025 saw consensus on AI vision indicates room for alignment. Agreeing on principles (data privacy, algorithmic transparency) and perhaps a Bilateral AI Regulatory Sandbox, allowing companies from both sides to test AI solutions in each other’s markets under supervised conditions, would enable innovation with oversight. This also positions both countries as co-leaders in shaping regional AI norms, rather than passive rule-takers.

Outlook through 2026

By end of 2026, a successful roadmap might include a memorandum of understanding on AI cooperation (covering joint research funding, talent exchange, and alignment in international AI governance). Both nations’ AI industries would benefit: Chinese AI firms gain credibility and partners in a key neighboring market, and Korean firms gain access to China’s dynamic AI ecosystem and resources, rather than having to “play catch-up” in isolation. As Kim Jong-moon of KIC China noted, South Korea excels in core sensors and smart manufacturing while China offers market scale and capital – together they can build a joint innovation ecosystem in AI.

Robotics: Collaboration in Automation and Intelligent Machines

Robotics is a natural focus for cooperation, given China’s rapid rise in this field and South Korea’s need for automation (to offset high labor costs and aging). China is already the world’s largest robotics market (about 40% of global market share) and is projected to more than double its market size from $47 billion in 2024 to $108 billion by 2028 (23% annual growth). South Korea, under its current administration, has adopted a “pro-robotics” stance, identifying robotics as a key industry for investment and workplace safety improvements. These complementary positions set the stage for robust collaboration:

Visitors watch a wheeled-leg robot from Hangzhou-based DEEP Robotics perform at a tech conference. Chinese robotics firms have impressed visiting Korean delegations, leading to joint projects in industrial and service robots.

  • Partnerships with Hangzhou’s Robot Startups. Two of Hangzhou’s “Six Little Dragons” are cutting-edge robotics firms – Unitree Robotics and DEEP Robotics – known for quadruped robots and humanoid robots. These companies have drawn frequent visits from South Korean corporate and government delegations, who are “astonished” at the level of Chinese robotics technology. During the Hangzhou stop, Hyundai Motor Group (which owns Boston Dynamics and has robotics divisions) could formalize a partnership with one of these firms. For example, Hyundai and Unitree/DEEP Robotics might launch a joint development project to build construction-site or factory inspection robots, addressing safety issues that Korea prioritizes. In fact, DEEP Robotics reports that after showcasing its autonomous quadrupeds, a Korean company proposed a joint project to build sewer-inspection robots – combining Chinese tech with Korean public-sector needs. Such collaborations would accelerate robot deployment at industrial sites in Korea while giving Chinese startups a valuable international partner for refinement and global marketing.
  • Cost and Deployment Advantage. Chinese robot makers offer 20–30% lower costs than Korean-made robots and boast extensive deployment experience. By integrating Chinese robots into Korean manufacturing and service sectors, South Korea can boost automation cost-effectively. The Korean delegation might sign procurement agreements to import Chinese robots (e.g. logistics robots, warehouse AGVs, medical assistant robots) for pilot programs in Korea. Conversely, Korean component suppliers (sensors, actuators, controllers, where Korea has strengths) can become part of Chinese firms’ supply chains. This component integration would particularly benefit Korean SMEs that make high-precision parts, enabling them to tap into China’s booming robot production.
  • Joint Ventures for Localized Manufacturing. To ease any political or security sensitivities, one strategy is establishing JV factories in neutral locations. For instance, a Shenzhen–Seoul Robotics Innovation Park could be envisioned, where Korean and Chinese firms co-produce robots for the wider Asian market. This park could assemble Korean-designed service robots with Chinese components, or vice versa, ensuring both sides share intellectual property and revenue. Shenzhen’s tech-friendly policies and South Korea’s robotics R&D (Korea has world-leading robot density in manufacturing) together can create a regional robotics hub.
  • Service Robotics and Social Applications. Beyond industrial robots, cooperation in service robots (for healthcare, hospitality, etc.) has high potential. Chinese service robots – from robotic vacuums to hotel delivery robots – have already gained popularity in South Korea due to their performance and value. In fact, Chinese-made robot vacuums (e.g. Roborock) have “won favor” with Korean consumers for high efficiency and low noise. Korean companies in home appliances (like LG Electronics) could partner with Chinese AI robot firms to develop next-generation smart home robots tailored to senior citizens or busy households. Joint innovation in eldercare robotics is especially pertinent: as both countries age, robots that assist the elderly (companion bots, exoskeletons, smart wheelchairs) could be co-developed, tested in real-world cross-cultural settings, and then commercialized widely.
  • Talent and Research Collaboration. The roadmap should include exchange of robotics researchers and engineers. Korea’s top institutes (KIMM, KAIST’s Hubo Lab, etc.) and China’s robotics labs (e.g. at Zhejiang University, which has produced founders of three “Little Dragons”) could initiate joint research on robotics AI, sensing, and mechatronics. An annual Sino-Korean Robotics Forum could be instituted alternating between Seoul and Shenzhen, bringing together startups and researchers to share breakthroughs. This keeps both ecosystems connected and spurs open innovation.

Outlook through 2026

A Hyundai-DEEP Robotics MOU on co-developing industrial robots, a Korean procurement program for 1,000 Chinese service robots (with training and support included), and agreements to standardize interfaces so that Korean and Chinese robotic systems can integrate smoothly. These steps would help both nations modernize their industries – China expands its robot export footprint, and South Korea meets its automation goals to counter labor shortages.

Biotechnology: Partnerships in Biopharma and Health Tech

Biotech and biopharmaceuticals represent another frontier for cooperation. South Korea has become a global biopharma hub in recent years – it is home to over 1,000 biotech companies and world-class biologics manufacturing (e.g. Samsung Biologics is a leading contract manufacturer). China, meanwhile, is rapidly expanding its biopharma sector as part of its strategic emerging industries, with local innovation on the rise and massive domestic healthcare demand. Both face external pressures (e.g. U.S. restrictions on biotech collaboration, as seen by the “Bio-5” alliance including South Korea), which actually increases the value of regional cooperation:

  • Joint Drug Development and Clinical Trials. Korean pharmaceutical firms (like Celltrion, SK Bioscience) and Chinese pharma or biotech startups can co-develop new drugs, especially for diseases prevalent in Asia. By pooling R&D efforts, they share costs and risks. Crucially, China offers vast clinical trial capacity and genetic data resources, while Korea offers advanced R&D capabilities and quality control. A new China-Korea Biotech Alliance could select a few projects (e.g. an AI-designed cancer therapy or a next-gen vaccine) to develop collaboratively, conducting trials in both countries. This would speed up regulatory approvals and give both populations faster access to breakthrough therapies.
  • Biologics Manufacturing and Supply Chains. South Korea is strong in biologics manufacturing (vaccines, monoclonal antibodies), and China has a huge market hungry for these products. A strategic partnership could see Korean firms establishing production lines in China’s biotech zones (such as Shenzhen or Shanghai) via joint ventures with Chinese firms, ensuring products meet Chinese regulatory requirements and tapping local distribution networks. Conversely, Chinese biotech companies can utilize Korea’s state-of-the-art GMP manufacturing for export products. This kind of two-way contract manufacturing leverages each side’s capacity – for example, a Chinese-developed biosimilar could be produced at scale in Korea for global markets, while a Korean-developed cell therapy could be manufactured in China to supply Chinese hospitals.
  • Startup and SME Collaboration. Many innovative therapies and healthtech solutions come from small startups. There are already initiatives to connect Korean biotech startups with the Chinese market – for instance, the AstraZeneca K-Bio Expressway project in 2025 helped eight Korean biopharma SMEs pitch to Chinese investors and partners. Building on this, the governments can support annual biotech startup exchange programs where startups from each country attend the other’s biotech conferences (such as the China International Import Expo medical section, or Korea Bio+ conference) with facilitation for matchmaking. Incubators like Korea Biotechnology Commercialization Center and China’s healthcare accelerators could run joint bootcamps for ventures working on AI-driven drug discovery, genomics, or medical devices, fostering cross-border startups that have a presence in both markets from the outset.
  • Genomics and Precision Medicine. China’s strength in genomics (home to BGI, one of the world’s largest genomics institutes) combined with South Korea’s strengths in clinical data and healthcare IT can drive advancements in precision medicine. A shared project could be establishing a Pan-Asia Genomic Database for research (with proper privacy safeguards), where Chinese and Korean researchers contribute anonymized genomic data to develop AI models for predicting diseases common in Asian populations. This would not only advance science but also yield diagnostic tools that both countries’ healthcare systems can use.
  • cooperation. A significant barrier in biotech is differing regulations. The two national regulators – e.g. NMPA (China) and MFDS (Korea) – could initiate a regulatory dialogue to streamline approval processes for each other’s companies. Even a mutual recognition agreement on GMP inspections or clinical trial data would save companies time and resources. Additionally, expanding the scope of the China–South Korea Free Trade Agreement to cover biotech and healthcare services could ease cross-border market entry. For example, reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers on biopharmaceutical imports/exports, or enabling easier establishment of healthcare joint ventures, would encourage more collaboration. Officials at the 2025 bilateral business leaders meeting highlighted that businesses should lead industrial cooperation in sectors like biotech – but they need supportive policy. The governments should thus provide policy incentives (grants, tax breaks) for joint biotech projects that promise mutual benefits.

Outlook through 2026

By 2026’s end, envisaged outcomes include a formal China-Korea Biotech Cooperation MOU outlining joint research funding in areas like vaccines and cancer, an agreement to expedite approval of each other’s important new drugs, and plans for a Biotech Innovation Park hosting Korean and Chinese firms. Such moves would help China meet its healthcare needs with high-quality products and help Korean biotech companies scale up with access to China’s vast market – a clear win-win for domestic economic enhancement. As the chief of KIC China observed, collaboration in biotech is already deepening and yielding results through technology alliances and market sharing; the goal now is to institutionalize and scale up these efforts.

Strategic Partnerships: Linking Leading Firms and Innovators

A central element of the 2026 engagement between China and South Korea is structured matchmaking between top Korean companies and major Chinese tech players because South Korea’s strengths in semiconductors, precision hardware, AI, robotics, and biotechnology complement China’s vast market scale, rapid innovation capacity, and application ecosystems — and by aligning government policy with business-to-business partnerships, both countries can unlock sustained mutual growth, strengthen supply-chain resilience, accelerate joint innovation, and achieve substantial commercial results that neither side could accomplish alone.

Below, we highlight potential partnerships that leverage each side’s strengths. These pairings include Korea’s chaebol leaders and both established Chinese tech giants and emerging innovators, notably Hangzhou’s “Six Little Dragons” and Greater Bay Area (GBA) firms:

  • Samsung Electronics & AI Startups in the Yangtze River Delta (DeepSeek, etc.). Samsung, as a leader in both semiconductors and consumer electronics, could find synergy with Hangzhou’s AI prowess. DeepSeek – which achieved cutting-edge AI breakthroughs in LLMs – is a natural partner for Samsung’s ambition to integrate AI across its devices and services. A partnership could involve Samsung investing in DeepSeek’s open-source AI models or using them to power Samsung’s next-gen smartphones and appliances with on-device AI. Likewise, Samsung’s advanced semiconductor chips (especially its AI accelerators) could be offered for DeepSeek to train larger models more efficiently. This chips-for-algorithms partnership combines Samsung’s hardware and a Chinese startup’s software, potentially yielding AI solutions optimized for Samsung’s global consumer base. Moreover, Alibaba’s initiative to welcome foreign investment into the Six Little Dragons aligns well here – Samsung Ventures could take a stake in DeepSeek or Manycore Tech, supporting their growth in exchange for access to their tech.
  • Hyundai Motor Group & Shenzhen’s EV and Robotics Firms (BYD, Unitree). Hyundai is keen to expand in electric vehicles and robotics. In the EV space, Hyundai has already started partnering with BYD, China’s top EV manufacturer. Notably, the new electric SUV by Hyundai’s joint venture in China (“Elexio”) is equipped with BYD’s LFP batteries – a first-time use of BYD as a supplier for Hyundai. This shows trust in Chinese battery tech and could be expanded: Hyundai and BYD might collaborate on EV platforms for emerging markets or co-develop battery recycling programs (combining BYD’s battery tech with Hyundai’s global reach). Additionally, Hyundai’s logistics arm (Hyundai Glovis) signed an MoU with BYD to share shipping capacity for vehicle transport, illustrating a broadening alliance from manufacturing to supply chain. In robotics, Hyundai’s acquisition of Boston Dynamics can be complemented by Chinese robotics. Hyundai could team up with Unitree Robotics (famous for agile quadruped robots) to create affordable service robots for factories and urban mobility. For example, a Hyundai-Unitree project might adapt Unitree’s quadruped for Hyundai’s smart factories or for use in Hyundai’s future smart mobility (perhaps robotic “delivery dogs” integrated with Hyundai’s last-mile solutions). The cost advantages of Chinese robots combined with Hyundai’s engineering and brand could produce robots competitive worldwide. An R&D center in Hangzhou or Seoul focusing on robot locomotion and AI, staffed by both Unitree and Hyundai engineers, would institutionalize this knowledge exchange.
  • SK Group & Chinese Tech Ecosystem (Semiconductors and AI). SK Group’s multiple arms offer several touchpoints. SK Hynix, as a memory chip giant, could deepen ties with the Chinese semiconductor ecosystem – e.g. secure long-term contracts to supply memory chips to Chinese server and smartphone companies (ensuring a steady market despite volatility). Also, SK Hynix might work with Chinese foundries on mature-node chip designs for AIoT devices, which is less sensitive but commercially valuable. On the AI front, SK Telecom (which has launched Korea’s first 500B-parameter AI model and is building a full-stack AI ecosystem) might collaborate with Chinese cloud giants such as Alibaba Cloud or Tencent Cloud. They could jointly develop AI service platforms for Korean and Chinese languages, or share AI training data in a privacy-compliant way to improve each other’s voice assistants and translation services. SK Telecom could also invite Chinese AI firms to its Ultra Large AI Alliance (an alliance SKT is spearheading for AI innovation), bringing Chinese innovations into Korea. This kind of partnership would integrate AI ecosystems: for instance, a Chinese AI startup could run on SKT’s 5G edge cloud in Korea, and a Korean AI solution could be distributed via Tencent’s super-app in China – an actual exchange of markets.
  • LG Corp (LG Electronics, LG Chem) & GBA Tech Leaders. LG has diverse interests from electronics to chemicals. LG Electronics could partner with China’s BrainCo (one of the six dragons, specializing in brain-machine interfaces) to create next-gen consumer electronics with BCI capabilities. For example, integrating BrainCo’s neural interface tech into LG’s AR/VR headsets or even home appliances (imagine appliances that adjust settings via subtle neural signals) could be a revolutionary product line. This plays to BrainCo’s innovation and LG’s consumer market expertise. Meanwhile, LG Energy Solution (a top EV battery maker) and SK On might seek cooperation with CATL or BYD in battery tech – albeit competitors, they could jointly develop global standards for battery safety or collaborate on battery recycling initiatives (a pressing need as EVs age). Another angle: LG Display could partner with Shenzhen-based firms (like Tencent or DJI) on displays for new devices – e.g., supplying high-end screens for Tencent’s gaming devices or DJI’s next drones, ensuring Chinese products have top-tier Korean display tech, while LG locks in a huge client.
  • Korean Game & Content Companies & Chinese Game Science,the and Tencent. China and South Korea both have vibrant gaming industries. Game Science, the Hangzhou studio behind the hit game Black Myth: Wukong, could collaborate with a Korean gaming powerhouse (say, Nexon or NCSoft) to co-develop games or cross-publish. Korean game companies are experts in global marketing and e-sports, whereas Game Science brings unique content and the vast Chinese gamer base. A co-production would share development costs and guarantee a hit in both markets by blending cultural elements. Additionally, K-Pop and K-Content & Chinese tech platforms is a softer but important area – companies like CJ E&M or HYBE (if part of delegation) could ink deals with Tencent or Alibaba’s streaming services to promote and monetize Korean content in China again, as cultural ties normalize (the thawing of the “Hallyu Ban” was noted in late 2025). This not only aids mutual understanding but also drives the creative economy.

Policy Recommendations for National Governments

Achieving the above cooperation requires not just business initiative but also strategic support and policy alignment from both governments. Below are targeted recommendations for South Korea and China to foster a conducive ecosystem:

South Korean Government: Policy Steps for Enhanced Cooperation

Chinese Government: Policy Steps for Enhanced Cooperation

  • Guarantee a Predictable Business Environment. One of South Korea’s key requests is for China to provide a stable and predictable environment for Korean companies. The Chinese government should explicitly assure that there will be no retaliatory measures (like those in 2017) and that Korean investors will be treated equally. This could be codified by updating the bilateral investment agreement or through public statements during the 2026 summit. Establishing a hotline between ministries to address Korean companies’ concerns in China in real-time can also build confidence.
  • Strengthen IP Rights and Legal Safeguards. To attract Korean tech partnerships, China must continue improving IP protection enforcement. Authorities could create a special IP Protection Taskforce in innovation zones frequented by foreign (including Korean) firms. This taskforce would fast-track any IP infringement complaints. Highlighting success cases where foreign IP was protected in Chinese courts will send a positive signal. Kim Dae-jong of the Korean SMB Association noted the need for robust mechanisms to protect IP and property rights as Korean SMEs re-enter China. Addressing this head-on will encourage more SMEs to leap.
  • Facilitate Two-Way Investment. China should reciprocate Korea’s outreach by encouraging Chinese companies to invest in South Korea or partner with Korean firms overseas. The Ministry of Commerce and tech regulators can identify areas for outward investment that are encouraged (for example, Chinese VC funds investing in Korean AI startups, or Chinese automakers collaborating in Korea’s EV supply chain). Easing capital controls for such strategic investments and perhaps creating a joint investment fund with Korean counterparts (each side contributing funds) to back collaborative projects would institutionalize capital flow toward cooperation.
  • Local Government Initiatives – Innovation Hubs. Empower tech hub cities such as Shanghai, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou to establish Korea-focused innovation programs. For example, Hangzhou could host an annual “Sino-Korea Innovation Expo” showcasing both countries’ startups and offering incentives (e.g., Hangzhou’s government might provide rent-free space for Korean AI firms for a year, and Korea’s KOTRA could sponsor Chinese firms’ participation). Shenzhen’s designation of 36Kr Space as an official Korean startup base is a great model – more such incubator tie-ups in multiple cities will create an ecosystem of collaboration. China’s Torch Center under MIIT, which KIC China cooperates with, can include a Korea dimension in its national high-tech zone programs (perhaps twinning a Chinese high-tech park with Korea’s Pangyo Techno Valley for exchanges).
  • Joint Policy Planning. Proactively include South Korea in China’s regional tech visions. For instance, as China formulates its post-14th Five-Year Plan science and tech strategy, it could explicitly mention cooperation with advanced neighboring economies (such as South Korea and Japan) as part of achieving self-reliance and innovation. Xi Jinping’s calls for tech self-reliance need not exclude friendly cooperation. Indeed, Chinese experts recognize that combining China’s market & industrial capacity with Korea’s high-tech components yields a win-win innovation ecosystem. Embracing that view, China can invite Korea to partake in initiatives like joint standard-setting (for 6G, AI ethics, etc.), which ultimately strengthens China’s goals by pooling resources.

By implementing these policies, Beijing would not only attract more Korean collaboration but also benefit its own tech upgrade. As noted by a Chinese ambassador, the two countries are supporters and beneficiaries of free trade and globalization and should jointly resist protectionism. That requires policy synergy: China maintaining an open, inclusive innovation climate (which KIC’s Kim noted is improving) and South Korea actively engaging despite strategic pressures. Both governments should see each other as strategic partners in innovation, not just competitors, to drive sustainable growth.

Integrating SMEs and Startups into the Bilateral Ecosystem

A key pillar of this roadmap is ensuring that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and startups from both countries are integrated into the cooperation framework – not just the large conglomerates. SMEs and young ventures are agile innovators and major employers (SMEs account for ~50% of Korea’s industrial output). Their participation will spread the benefits of cooperation widely and create resilient networks. Here are targeted strategies:

  • Cross-Border Innovation Hubs & Incubators. Leverage organizations such as KISED, Innobiz, and KOTRA to establish physical and virtual hubs where SMEs from both countries can soft-land. The recent example of Innobiz Association launching an office in Shenzhen’s 36Kr Space to host Korean startups is a blueprint. This provides shared infrastructure and immediate local connectivity for Korean SMEs in China. Likewise, South Korea can host Chinese startups in its innovation clusters (e.g. a “Shenzhen Center” in Pangyo Techno Valley or Busan’s EcoDelta tech hub) – offering co-working space, mentorship on Korean regulations, and matchmaking with Korean SMEs. Governments can support these hubs with subsidies. The result is a two-way incubator network lowering entry barriers for startups in each other’s markets.
  • Bilateral Startup Exchange Programs. Build on the TIPS program exchange described in late 2025, where 12 Korean deep-tech startups traveled to Shenzhen to meet Chinese VCs and accelerators. Make this a regular program: semi-annual “Startup Express” delegations in each direction, alternating sectors (one focused on AI/Big Data, another on biotech, etc.). Include pitch sessions, corporate visits, and perhaps a demo day in front of a joint Sino-Korean investor committee. Such exchanges inject fresh ideas into both ecosystems and often spark partnership deals or investments on the spot.
  • Joint SME Consortium Bids. Encourage SMEs to form joint consortia to tackle large projects – for example, a consortium of Korean and Chinese automation SMEs could jointly bid to automate a manufacturing facility in a third country (combining Korean quality and Chinese cost competitiveness). Government procurement or ODA (official development assistance) projects can be earmarked for such joint bids. This would integrate SMEs into big initiatives that they couldn’t execute alone, and create lasting business ties.
  • SME Financing and Venture Investment Cooperation. A Bilateral Innovation Fund (public-private) could be established, dedicated to investing in SMEs or startups that have a cooperation element. For instance, a fund where both Korea’s SME Ministry and a Chinese counterpart contribute, alongside venture investors, to finance startups that agree to have operations in both countries or joint ownership. Additionally, facilitate VC cooperation that Korea’s VCs and China’s VCs could launch co-investment vehicles to scout promising startups in each other’s markets. The presence of Korean Business Angels Association in Shenzhen engaging Chinese capital is an excellent start – institutionalize this by signing MOUs between angel networks and VC associations of both sides to share deal flow and collaborate on due diligence.
  • Supply Chain Linkage Platforms. Digital platforms can be deployed to connect SME suppliers and buyers across borders. For example, an online China-Korea Tech Parts Marketplace might list Korean SME-produced components (sensors, specialty chemicals, software modules) for Chinese manufacturers to source, and vice versa list Chinese SME products for Korean companies. Back this with trade promotion agencies verifying quality and providing trade finance insurance. This directly integrates SMEs into larger companies’ supply chains overseas. Given the complementary nature of industries (Chinese factories need quality parts; Korean SMEs seek large clients), this can enhance supply chain resilience and diversification.
  • Innovation Challenges and Hackathons. Organize joint hackathons or innovation challenges inviting SMEs/startups from both nations to solve industry problems. For instance, a “Smart Factory Challenge” could be co-hosted by a Korean and Chinese ministry, where mixed teams (including members from both countries’ SMEs) propose AI/robotics solutions to improve manufacturing. Winners receive grants and incubation support to develop the project in partnership with a conglomerate. This not only produces practical solutions but also fosters personal networks among young innovators across the two countries.
  • Human Capital Exchange for SMEs. Often SMEs struggle to navigate foreign markets due to talent gaps. Governments can fund exchange of experts or interns – e.g. send Korean IT graduates to intern at Chinese AI startups for 6 months and bring Chinese engineering interns to Korean SMEs. This cross-pollinates skills and helps build language/cultural bridges at the grassroots SME level. Over time, a cadre of bilingual, bicultural professionals familiar with each other’s business environments will emerge, organically knitting the ecosystems together.

By implementing these measures, SMEs in both countries can become active participants in the bilateral cooperation boom, rather than bystanders. As noted in a KoreaTechDesk report, SMEs and startups are seen as the “first test case” for renewed Korea–China economic ties and can reinvigorate growth if appropriately supported. Their success stories will also build political goodwill – the success of a small Korean medtech firm in China or a Chinese AI startup thriving in Korea demonstrates the mutual benefits of openness. Significantly, involving SMEs spreads economic gains beyond the giants, aiding inclusivity (which aligns with both governments’ domestic agendas of supporting innovation and entrepreneurship).

Mutual Domestic Economic Enhancement through Cooperation

A core rationale for this strategic cooperation is that it will bolster each country’s domestic economic goals. By leveraging each other’s strengths, China and South Korea can accelerate growth in ways that purely domestic efforts might not achieve:

  • Driving Innovation and New Industries. Collaboration can help create new S-curves of growth for both economies. South Korea seeks new growth engines beyond its traditional heavy industries; partnering with China’s dynamic tech scene provides exposure to cutting-edge developments (like China’s advances in AI chatbots, robotics, etc. that have in some cases outpaced Korea). This knowledge infusion helps Korea’s firms innovate faster and stay competitive globally. China, on the other hand, can benefit from Korea’s world-class R&D in materials, memory chips, and biotech to boost its own innovation quality. Kim from KIC China highlighted that complementary cooperation along innovation chains will yield win-win outcomes. Tangibly, if a joint AI research yields a breakthrough or a co-developed drug succeeds, both nations gain a new high-value industry (and possibly exports).
  • Economic Growth and Job Creation. Successful joint ventures and market openings will stimulate economic activity and jobs at home. For South Korea, deeper access to China’s market (the world’s second-largest economy) can significantly lift exports – which translates into jobs in Korean factories and labs. The resumption of cultural exports (entertainment, tourism) and tech exports to China after years of downturn is already improving Korean service sector earnings. For China, attracting Korean investment, whether it’s an LG factory or a network of Korean startups, creates jobs in Chinese localities and upgrades skills of the workforce. Bilateral trade, already $328 billion in 2024, can grow further, contributing to GDP on both sides. Moreover, SME cooperation ensures job growth is inclusive: as SMEs expand internationally, they hire more at home (e.g. a Korean machinery SME landing Chinese clients will need to scale up domestic production).
  • Supply Chain Resilience and Industrial Security. By intertwining supply chains, each country reduces single-source dependency and vulnerability to external shocks. South Korea’s economy (highly export-driven) becomes more resilient if it can maintain stable trade with China even amid global uncertainties – evidenced in 2025 by record semiconductor exports driving a rebound. China’s economy, aiming for “dual circulation”, benefits by securing reliable inputs from Korea and having an alternative to Western suppliers. The Reuters report noted foreign tensions have led companies to adopt a “China plus one” strategy; here, the “plus one” could be South Korea, and vice versa. Such mutual fallback options protect domestic industries from geopolitical risks, thus safeguarding growth.
  • Technological Self-Reliance without Isolation. Both governments have goals of tech self-reliance – China explicitly so in its plans, and South Korea in reducing reliance on any single country (for instance, diversifying away from Japanese materials post-2019). Bilateral cooperation provides a middle path that by relying on each other, they reduce reliance on third parties while not isolating themselves. For example, if Korea sources more machine tools or basic chips from China instead of only one western source, it meets its resilience goal. If China gets advanced photoresists or AI chips from Korea instead of having to develop 100% in-house, it accelerates progress. In other words, they become each other’s trusted suppliers, which strengthens domestic tech capabilities faster than go-it-alone approaches.
  • Addressing Social Challenges and Shared Demographics. As detailed earlier, both face aging populations and productivity challenges. Joint tech solutions (AI, robotics, biotech for healthcare) will improve domestic welfare: robots in elder care ease burdens on Korea’s healthcare, Chinese AI diagnostic tools deployed in Korean hospitals can improve care, and Korean medical innovations brought to China can help its aging citizens. Enhanced senior tourism and healthcare exchange (like Chinese seniors visiting Korea for wellness, and Koreans trying TCM in China) turn a demographic challenge into economic activity. All these contribute to domestic service sector growth and improved quality of life, which are key government objectives.
  • Regional Stability and Growth Leadership. A strong China–Korea partnership in tech also positions both as co-architects of East Asia’s economic future, which carries domestic benefits. They can set standards that their companies are best positioned to meet, effectively giving their industries a home-field advantage across Asia. It also reduces the chance of political conflicts spilling over into economic damage (as interdependence creates a stability incentive). Stability and predictability are crucial for investor confidence in domestic markets – companies invest more at home when they see stable export markets and cooperative international relations. Thus, cooperation is a virtuous cycle: better relations lead to economic gains, which in turn reinforce the relationship.

Therefore, mutual domestic enhancement is at the heart of this roadmap. Each country amplifies its strengths by partnering that South Korea’s “made-in-Chaebol” innovations can scale on China’s platform, and China’s “mass innovation” breakthroughs gain refinement and global channels via Korea. Both governments should actively communicate these benefits to the public to build support for cooperation. Emphasizing success stories – e.g. a Korean AI firm doubled its jobs after winning Chinese contracts, or a Chinese biotech cure saving Korean lives – will underline how working together makes each nation stronger and more prosperous domestically.

Conclusion

The year 2026 could mark a turning point in Asia’s tech landscape if South Korea’s president and top business leaders visit China. By following the strategic roadmap outlined, mapping sectoral opportunities, forging marquee firm partnerships, implementing supportive policies, and integrating SMEs into the collaboration, the two countries can transition from cautious engagement to a robust, future-oriented alliance in technology and innovation. This roadmap envisions South Korea and China developing a multi-layered cooperation model that spans government agreements, corporate joint ventures, startup exchanges, and research collaboration. As a pragmatic and strategic model, it acknowledges global challenges (geopolitical rivalries, supply chain risks) yet finds opportunity in partnership, aligning with both nations’ long-term goals. Moreover, a thriving China–Korea tech partnership will be a stabilizing force for the region, proving that collaboration can prevail over conflict. As both nations look to “build a sustainable tomorrow” (the APEC 2025 theme) by connecting, innovating, and prospering together, this strategic cooperation roadmap can serve as a guide to turning that vision into reality.

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