The potential revival of a large-scale K-pop concert in mainland China represents more than a commercial triumph for South Korea—it is a strategic cultural moment that offers mutual advantage, and in particular a strong upside for China. In the short term, such an event can energise bilateral cultural flows, reconnect youth audiences across the seas, and visually symbolise a thaw in relations that lifts consumption of entertainment and live-events revenue in Chinese cities. In the long term, the concert helps embed Korean popular formats into China’s entertainment ecosystem, boosting live-music infrastructure, fan-economy engagement, and the cultural commerce that supports China’s vision of transforming into a global cultural power.

Importantly for China, this re-entry of K-pop becomes part of its broader “Chinese culture going global” ambition — by hosting a highly visible, internationally-connected entertainment event, China signals an open, world-class cultural marketplace, strengthens its soft-power appeal, and deepens the cultural-economic ties around which new export-oriented creative industries can thrive. At a time when Chinese cultural policy emphasises building high-quality cultural exports and expanding the international influence of Chinese culture, the event also raises the profile of China’s venues, organisations and cultural-exchange platforms on a global stage (see e.g., the “culture going out” strategy).

With so many state, municipal and commercial-entertainment players in China, clarity, speed and transparency are essential. This report therefore sets out a structured rationale for why all stakeholders—the Korean Ministry of Culture, entertainment companies, broadcasters and Chinese counterparts—should treat the concert not merely as a business deal but as a bilateral cultural-exchange initiative, and why engaging with the central‐state China Arts & Entertainment Group (CAEG) offers the most credible pathway to achieving both China’s and Korea’s cultural-economic objectives.

CAEG: China’s Official Cultural Exchange Conduit

China strictly regulates foreign cultural performances. Since 2016 Beijing has barred most Korean pop culture (the “unofficial” K-wave ban after the THAAD dispute), and recent diplomacy suggests only a cautious thaw. In November 2025 President Xi and South Korean President Lee agreed to expand cultural ties, but even China’s officials warn that “legal and procedural constraints” still hinder full normalization. In practice, only state‐sanctioned “cultural exchange” channels can host foreign acts. China Arts and Entertainment Group (CAEG) is a central government entity (under the Minister of Culture and State Council) created to organize exactly these exchanges. CAEG (and its subsidiary, China Performing Arts Agency) serves as “the main force and channel” for China’s overseas cultural performances. It produces national arts festivals (e.g. the “Meet in Beijing” festival) and inter-governmental shows. Any first large-scale K-pop concert in Beijing will thus need CAEG’s involvement to obtain permits, venues and official legitimacy.

• State Mandate. The Regulations on Foreign Cultural Performances and Exhibitions (MCT 1997/2004) vest China’s Ministry of Culture with exclusive approval rights over all foreign shows. Article 6 makes the Ministry responsible for “national-level foreign cultural performances” and requires prior approval of any foreign show. Likewise, Article 10 limits eligible organizers to accredited entities – central cultural bodies or government-recognized institutions involved in foreign exchange. CAEG, as a Ministry-administered state enterprise, is explicitly such an entity. Its China Performing Arts Agency (CPAA) is China’s designated “main channel” for cultural exchange (organizing intergovernmental festivals, multinational art delegations, etc.). By contrast, other groups lack this status: CMG (China Media Group/CCTV) is a broadcaster, and SMG (Shanghai Media Group) is a local media conglomerate; neither is a Ministry-approved cultural exchange organizer. CMG’s role is media content, not live event licensing, and SMG Live’s focus is domestic productions in Shanghai.
• Venue and Scope. Beijing’s premier venues (e.g. the National Centre for the Performing Arts, Bird’s Nest/Water Cube for concerts, etc.) are under national or Beijing municipal jurisdiction. CAEG regularly programs Beijing’s city-wide festivals – in April 2019 its president Li Jinsheng noted CAEG “organizes” the annual Meet in Beijing Arts Festival (which draws 600+ acts from 25 countries). A K-pop showcase presented through CAEG could be treated as part of such an official festival or a “Year of Culture” event. In contrast, CMG or SMG would only control media outlets or Shanghai venues. For example, SMG Live “is a performing arts & cultural group under SMG…owning 17 professional theatres” mostly in Shanghai. Partnering with SMG might enable a show in Shanghai, but would lack authority (and political cover) for a flagship Beijing event.

Regulatory Context and Cultural-Exchange Framing

Chinese law distinguishes between government-to-government exchange, non-commercial people-to-people events, and purely commercial performances. The safest pathway for a first K-pop concert is as a cultural exchange – ideally under a bilateral cultural cooperation agreement – rather than a standalone commercial concert. CAEG exists precisely to implement such exchanges (the Wikipedia profile notes CAEG was set up to “transform cultural institutions into modern enterprises” with state Council backing, organizing inter-governmental programs). A commercial producer without CAEG could apply for a license, but they would face stringent scrutiny under Articles 3–6 of the regulations (foreign acts “must obey national diplomatic goals” and need Ministry approval).

By engaging CAEG as an “exchange partner”, the Korean Ministry of Culture can frame the concert as a mutual cultural event. This aligns with Chinese precedent: for years CAEG has sponsored events like the “Asia Arts Festival” and “Meet in Beijing”, often highlighting one guest country. For example, the 2019 Meet in Beijing festival was reframed around “Asian culture” for an Asian Civilizations conference – suggesting China is open to pitched cultural showcases. If Korea were officially honored or included via CAEG, K-pop performances could be integrated under that banner.

Limits of Media or Private Partnerships

Recent deals illustrate the difference. In November 2025, KBS (Korea’s public broadcaster) and China Media Group signed a landmark MOU to resume TV and news exchanges. However, this deal focuses on content sharing and festivals (e.g. reviving the Korea-China Song Festival) – not live stage events. CMG’s remit is broadcasting, so even with CMG’s support the actual concert would still require cultural approval through MCT channels. Similarly, a partnership with an entertainment promoter or broadcaster (like SMG) would lack official accreditation to secure performing rights for foreign artists.

Role of CAEG and CPAA: State-Level Production

CAEG’s charter includes “organizing inter-governmental cultural exchange programs entrusted by the Ministry of Culture” and “planning and organizing large-scale cultural and art activities”. Its CPAA unit has experience running massive events under government auspices: e.g., opening ceremonies for the APEC summit, ASEAN Arts Festival, etc.. In fact, CPAA has convened art festivals and tour events involving 100+ countries. CAEG also operates global Chinese New Year (“Happy Chinese New Year”) concerts – for instance, in Jan 2020 it organized a “China-Korea Friendly Music Concert” at Seoul’s Sejong Center, showing its capacity for Sino-Korean exchange. CAEG’s involvement would give confidence to Chinese authorities that the K-pop event conforms to China’s cultural diplomacy goals.

Strategic Recommendations for Korea’s Ministry of Culture

Given this context, Korean planners should prioritize dialogue with CAEG (and the Chinese Ministry of Culture) rather than negotiating solely with media companies. The first large-scale K-pop concert in China will be as much a political-cultural occasion as a commercial venture. By working through CAEG – e.g. proposing the concert as part of an official Korea–China cultural exchange program – the Korean side can leverage CAEG’s legal authority and networks. This approach helps clear the regulatory hurdles noted by Korean officials.

In summary, CAEG is the gateway to China’s cultural stage. Its state backing and expertise make it the logical partner to revive K-wave performances in China. Engaging CAEG (and framing the event as a government-level cultural exchange) is far more likely to secure approvals, especially for a Beijing show. The Korean Ministry of Culture should thus invite CAEG into discussions to co-design the reopening of K-pop in China, ensuring compliance with Chinese law and maximizing diplomatic goodwill.